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A Thought Experiment 
The birth of EU criminal law has not been an easy one. Since the drafting of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Member States of the European Union have seen the necessity of increased 
collaboration in that field, but they have been cautious in giving away legislative powers to 
decide on crime and punishment. The story is well known and does not need to be re-told here.  
Nordic scholars in particular – including myself – have criticised EU criminal law on the 
grounds that it represents a far more instrumental approach than that which is characteristic of 
the criminal policy of the Nordic countries, and that it would risk leading to increased repression 
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if implemented in full.1 Raimo Lahti, for instance, has analysed the tension between EU and 
Nordic criminal policy.2 
The point I wish to make in this article is rather simple. Maybe we could, even as a kind of 
thought experiment, look at EU criminal law not only from the perspective of its shortcomings 
and deficits, but from the point of view of its achievements and its potential. European criminal 
law is a legal construct, and the way we construct or reconstruct it accordingly matters for what 
it is. 
Instead of a merely critical analysis, this article presents an alternative view; an alternative 
vision. Its point is that we may have been using too simplistic a model of how law works and 
becomes effective in a society. We might have to add a bit of idealism to our realism. Maybe 
we have not yet realised that as criminal policy matures, it must also change substantially. We 
may need a bit of social theory to see this point. Broadening our perspective on European 
criminal law enables us to see more of its nuances. 
The perspective that I wish to introduce is that of legitimacy, which I take to include some 
symbolic aspects as well.3 If it is our law, and not just something imposed on us, then such a 
perspective makes sense. Legitimacy draws on a variety of sources: on democracy, human 
rights, rule of law, decent and rational criminal policy, etc. This links to broader and deeper 
issues concerning how we think about the role of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(‘AFSJ’) as one of the constitutive, defining elements of the European Union as a polity.4 In 
this article we will focus mainly on just one aspect of the AFSJ, namely the narrow emphasis 
on effectiveness and deterrence – a core feature of European criminal law. 
 
                                                        
 Professor, University of Helsinki 
1 Elholm, Thomas, ‘Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression?’, 17 Eur. 
J. Crime, Crim. Law & Crim. Just. 191 (2009), 219.  
2 Lahti Raimo, ‘Towards a Principled European Criminal Policy: Some Lessons from The Nordic 
Countries’. In J Banach-Gutierrez – C Harding (Eds.), EU Criminal Law and Policy: Values, Principles 
and Methods (Routledge 2017), p. 56-69. Cf. also Nuotio, Kimmo, ‘The Rationale of the Nordic Penal 
Policy Compared with the European Approach’, in Kimmo Nuotio (Ed.), Festschrift in Honour of Raimo 
Lahti (Forum Iuris 2007), 157. 
3 Whether to criminalise business cartels or not is a debate in which the symbolical effects of criminal 
law play a role as well. See the discussion in Günsberg, Patrik S, ‘Exploring the case for criminalisation 
of business cartels in Europe’, in J Banach-Gutierrez – C Harding (Eds.), EU Criminal Law and Policy: 
Values, Principles and Methods (Routledge, 2017), 212, 224. 
4 See, e.g., Massimo Fichera, The Foundations of the EU as a Polity (Elgar 2018).  
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Hard deterrence 
   
The belief in (hard) deterrence has been a meeting ground for different efforts and points of 
view at the EU level. The use of criminal law has been a tempting option for the EU 
Commission, since it represents something more than just administrative sanctioning. And for 
the EU Commission, the main worry has constantly been the lack of effectiveness of EU law. 
The effet utile principle has been characterised as a constitutional master principle of EU law. 
This, in turn, has led to an instrumental view of criminalisation: criminal law as a means to 
other ends.5 I would like to invite us to think about criminal law as an institution, in non-
instrumental terms. Paradoxically, law might work better when grasped this way. 
The sanctioning force of criminal law is nothing new, since in some sense the coercive force 
may even be regarded as a defining factor of legality. How we understand and read law is a 
matter of choice. To my mind we have too easily been denying a “legal” reading of European 
criminal law. I want to make a few remarks on this matter. 
Much of EU criminal law reasoning builds on the view that law works as a deterrent. For a 
rational potential offender, the risk of detection and punishment is an extra burden which the 
potential offender will choose to avoid. Simply by taking a different look at how criminal law 
in fact works we could open up a fresh perspective on many of the most central issues in EU 
criminal law. We do not have to abandon the idea of hard deterrence completely. But we should 
enrich it by stressing especially the positive dimension of "general prevention" inherent in the 
deterrence paradigm. By reading EU criminal law in this new way, we could alleviate the 
tension observed by Raimo Lahti and many others. Seeing alternatives to hard deterrence is not 
that difficult. Proportionality, for instance, is one obvious alternative. A tempting one, and a 
one that may serve as a bridge. The "Act-proportionality" perspective, namely the idea that a 
sanction must be proportionate to the seriousness of the sanctioned act, which is discussed in 
more detail below, picks up the point of view of values.      
I wish to discuss the aim of punishment from two intertwined angles, namely the level of 
European Union criminal law and the level of domestic criminal law. EU criminal law is, of 
course, a rather special case since it does not concern criminal law directly, but rather organises 
                                                        
5 Kaarlo Tuori, ‘Ultima Ratio as a Constitutional Principle’. Onati Socio-Legal Series (Online), 2013, 3 
(1), 6, 18. 
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the way criminal law is used at the national level. It inter alia sets the minimum requirements 
in some cases in this respect.  
In the following section, we will first look at the understanding of what punishments are 
expected to deliver, that is, what requirements arise from the level of EU law. We see a trend 
toward a more mature criminal policy view at this level. The highly interesting thing is how 
this European level interacts with the level of the national legal orders. Bridges between these 
orders should be built to bring about an approximation of values, not merely of laws. We have 
a few remarks on what potential we have to build further on that, once we open up our 
perspective a bit.        
 
‘Effective, Dissuasive and Proportionate’ 
Even before the EU enjoyed formal competence in matters criminal, EU law repeatedly 
included the poorly-defined notion that penalties applied for infringements of EU law on the 
national level must be ‘effective, dissuasive and proportionate’. The term ‘penalty’ includes 
administrative and other sanctions: the Member States are required to enforce Union law but 
are broadly free to choose the means by which they do this. In its case-law, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (‘CJEU') has interpreted the phrase ‘effective, dissuasive and 
proportionate’. 
This formulation is also used more narrowly in the EU criminal law context strictu sensu, since 
the same standard formulation has been included in the Framework Decisions and later 
Directives requiring Member State to criminalise certain activities in their domestic legislation. 
Often EU Framework Decisions and Directives also require that the penalty scales provided for 
in the national legal orders need to allow for extradition or surrender of the suspected person. 
In most jurisdictions this requires that the penalty scale provides for a sentence of 
imprisonment.  
Article 5 of the Directive on the counterfeiting of the Euro6, to give just one example, states 
that for certain offences, the offences shall be punishable by a maximum sanction which 
                                                        
6 Directive 2014/62/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the protection 
of the euro and other currencies against counterfeiting by criminal law, and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA. OJ L 151, 21.5.2014, 1. 
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provides for imprisonment. For some offences, that maximum must be at least eight years’ 
imprisonment.   
The secret formula itself has, however, never really been formally defined. It originates in the 
case law of the CJEU. Already in the famous Greek Maize case7 we find the formula being 
used:  
“… whilst the choice of penalties remains within their discretion, they must ensure in particular 
that infringements of Community law are penalized under conditions, both procedural and 
substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a 
similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.” 
 
In the case law of the CJEU the contents of this formula have been further elaborated and 
specified. We may only refer here to a few cases as examples. The Texdata Software Case C-
418/118 approached the issue from both sides the penalties must be punitive enough, but not 
too punitive. It becomes also clear that the Court only gives guidance on how to interpret the 
formula, but the final interpretation and application is for the national authority applying the 
law. In the Case LCL La Crédit Lyonnais9 the Court went on to determine the contents of the 
formula in the general area of sanctioning the EU law infringements on the national level and 
developed a test for assessing the dissuasiveness of the measure.  
 
In any event, we find a much more reduced use of the formula of "dissuasive effective and 
proportionate sanctions" in the context of EU criminal law strictu sensu. It seems that this arises 
from the fact that the harmonisation model adopted for cooperation in legal matters is generally 
minimum harmonisation only, meaning that the Member States have discretion when 
implementing the Framework Decisions and Directives. Today, the obligations have been set 
in a rather detailed manner which in turn decreases the independent role of the formula. 
 
It deserves to be mentioned that for the Court criminal penalties seem to be generally more 
dissuasive than other penalties due to the particular nature of criminal sanctioning. This can be 
seen in the famous ruling annulling the Council Framework decision on the protection of the 
                                                        
7Case C-68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965, para 24.    
8 Case C-418/11 Texdata Software GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2013:588.  
9 Case C-565/12 LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais SA v Fesih Kalhan, ECLI:EU:C:2014:190. 
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environment on the grounds that it had been adopted using the wrong legal basis, because the 
provisions could have instead been included in a Directive made under Community 
environmental competence.10 In this case it was difficult for the Council to contest the argument 
of the Commission since the Framework Decision was precisely meant to introduce obligations 
for the Member States to ensure that they provide protection of the environment through 
criminal law in their national legislation. 
All three components of the formula are somewhat vague. Effectiveness should be taken to 
mean that the regulation will have an impact of the activities regulated. But it does not give any 
clear model about how to estimate this. Effectiveness means thus suitability of the legal and 
policy instruments to serve the goals set by the legislature.   
Proportionality has, as is generally known, two possible interpretations. There is act-
proportionality which requires that the punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of the 
offence. The second interpretation is means-end proportionality. This second interpretation of 
proportionality would obviously be close to the effectiveness test. In criminal law, act-
proportionality is particularly significant, since it reveals the penal value of the act in question. 
It is rather obvious that sentences that are both effective and proportionate may help with the 
internalisation of those values and also give reasons for potential perpetrators not to engage in 
the forbidden conduct. Proportionality and effectiveness are thus internally linked. If we look 
at this discussion through the lenses of a legitimacy perspective, the effectiveness in some sense 
always gets realized through systemic legitimacy. The criminal sanctions should be appropriate: 
they should not be too lenient, but nor should they be too harsh.   
And, finally, we would have to define what we mean by dissuasive penalties. Michael Faure, 
who has studied this, takes this to be the ‘Gary Becker and law and economics’ part: 
dissuasiveness would mean that the prospect of these penalties would neutralise the incentive 
to commit the offence.11 Effectiveness is also related to dissuasiveness, since obviously in order 
for the regulation to be effective, it must be somewhat dissuasive as seen from the point of view 
of the actors within the field. We might say that the two concepts take different perspectives: 
                                                        
10 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I–7879.  
11 Michael Faure, ‘Effective, Proportional and Dissuasive Penalties in the Implemention of the 
Environmental Crime and Ship-source Pollution Directives: Questions and Challenges’. European 
Energy and Environmental Law Review. December 2010, 256. Cf. the classical essay Gary S. Becker, 
‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’. Journal of Political Economy, 76 (2), March-April, 
169.  
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dissuasiveness adopts the perspective of an actor within the field, whereas effectiveness adopts 
a systemic point of view. In fact, proportionality also has a link with dissuasiveness: the risk of 
a proportionate criminal sanction provides the potential perpetrator with reasons not to commit 
the offence, and thus has a dissuasive effect. We see even here that there is more than one way 
to theorize dissuasiveness: we could look at it in a more narrow deterrence perspective, or we 
could adopt a broader perspective which allows for our motivations to act be influenced by 
issues of values. We may simply share the values informing our laws, which makes it easier for 
us to comply.       
After having briefly dealt with the formula ‘effective, dissuasive and proportionate’, we could 
reflect on what is excluded by this definition. This question is not quite as easy as it may seem. 
I would wish to explore whether should take a fresh look at how we understand general 
deterrence in this setting.  
We have two ways of looking at this. The negative deterrence point of view highlights the fact 
that the threat of punishment operates as a reason not to commit the offence. This line of thought 
can be followed all the way to P.J.A Feuerbach, who developed his famous theory that 
psychological coercion12 was necessary in order to safeguard freedom in a society given the 
temptation to violate the rights of others. The threat of punishment was needed to counteract 
this temptation. Thus, the fear of punishment was to be kept alive by enforcing the commands 
of law when breached by individuals.  
There is a long line of theorizing about this mechanism of fear of sanctions motivating people 
not to breach legal obligations. According to law and economics theories, human behavior can 
be looked at as rational. Human beings (as well as legal persons) are selfish and would choose 
to act wrongfully, unless a threat of punishment had been introduced to counterbalance the 
short-term benefits that could be gained by breaching legal obligations.  
Gary Becker (above) introduced micro-economic thinking in this field by claiming that rational 
actors need to be steered by sanctioning their actions accordingly. General deterrence requires 
that both the risk of being caught and the severity of criminal sanction will be kept high enough 
since the general deterrent effect is being determined as the product of the two values.  If the 
(perceived) risk of being caught is low, even very high punishments would not do the job, 
                                                        
12 PJA Feuerbach, Lehrbuch des gemeinen in Deutschland gültigen peinlichen Rechts. Giessen 1832, § 
14.  
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whereas if the (perceived) risk of being caught is very high, rational actors would be persuaded 
not to offend, even if the punishments were low. 
We could now make a first observation. The formula ‘effective, dissuasive and proportionate’ 
must cover both aspects. We could thus say that criminal punishments not only have to be heavy 
enough, but also that must be applied and enforced in case of breaches. Without adequate 
surveillance and punishment of offenders, not only effectiveness, but also dissuasiveness will 
suffer. For the EU, this part of the effective implementation is much more difficult to handle. 
The expectation is that the domestic legal order operates effectively and is thus able to ensure 
some minimum effectiveness of the investigation and prosecution of those crimes. From a 
deterrence point of view, we should again observe that an easy way to increase general 
deterrence would be to increase the risk of detection and prosecution. As previously stated, 
Effectiveness and dissuasiveness are thus internally linked.      
Even this rather brief survey shows that EU criminal law does not see criminal law as operating 
using a different logic than other types of law that seek to steer human behavior. The fact that 
the same formula is being used for non-criminal as criminal sanctions indicates that criminal 
law is being seen in a similar light. 
This is of course a discussion which we have had also in the domestic setting: how does criminal 
law strictu sensu differ from administrative law (or administrative criminal law) in this sense? 
This distinction is far from clear, if we think for instance of the distinction between criminal 
law stricu sensu and regulatory criminal law in England, or between 
Ordnungswidrigkeitenrecht and criminal law in German law.13 Criminal law and criminal 
conviction seem intrinsically to carry an aspect of moral blame or stigma, which is weaker or 
absent in the case of administrative sanctions. According to German law, legal persons can only 
be charged for administrative, not criminal, infranctions.14 Ulrich Sieber has observed that the 
rise of Mega-Ordnungswidrigkeiten, such as fines for cartels, has challenged the existing 
distinction, especially due to the lower level procedural safeguards provided for offences in thie 
                                                        
13 Rebecka Williams, ‘Criminal Law in England and Wales. Just Another Form of Regulatory Tool?’, 
in Matthew Dyson – Benjamin Vogel (Eds.), The Limits of Criminal Law. Anglo-German Concepts and 
Principles (Intersentia 2018), 207. 
14 Wolfgang Wohlers, ‘Criminal Law as a Regulatory Tool’, in Matthew Dyson – Benjamin Vogel 
(Eds.), The Limits of Criminal Law. Anglo-German Concepts and Principles (Intersentia 2018), 235.  
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administrative category.15 The more interesting point is this: we can observe that the more we 
stress bare sanctioning in how we set the sanction for breach, the more instrumentally actors 
themselves respond.  
In EU criminal law this discussion concerning what renders criminal law different emerged 
especially in the context of the dispute over the correct legal basis of some Framework 
Decisions during the first years of the Amsterdam Treaty.  
Advocate General Mazak’s opinion delivered on 28 June 2007 is of particular significance in 
this regard. The opinion was issued in the case concerning the Framework Decision on Ship-
Source Pollution. Mazak discussed at length the ways in which criminal law stands out as a 
particular field of law. It uses “the most severe and most dissuasive tool of social control – 
punishments” and it “delineates the outer limits of acceptable behavior” and, by doing this, 
“protects the values held dearest by the community at large”.16  
 
Criminal penalties also “reflect particular social disapproval and are in that respect of a 
qualitatively different nature as compared with other punishments such as administrative 
sanctions”. He continues that it can safely be said that “criminal law is characterised by its 
dissuasive or deterrent nature”. It should, however, be borne in mind that “deterrence is not the 
only identifiable purpose of criminal law”.17  
 
He also makes the observation that there is “no uniform concept of the notion of criminal law 
and the Member States may have very different ideas when it comes to identifying in closer 
detail the purposes which it should serve and the effects it may have”.18  
 
There are several things that are significant in this Opinion. As understood by AG Mazak, one 
way to reconcile different views would be to say that the dominant view on the EU law level 
(an instrumental view of criminal law as a tool of social control) holds for the domestic level 
as well, but  that this only covers one of the purposes of criminal law. Thus, domestic law may 
add other layers, as it certainly does. 
                                                        
15 Ulrich Sieber, ‘Administrative Sanction in German Criminal Law’, in Matthew Dyson – Benjamin 
Vogel (Eds.), The Limits of Criminal Law. Anglo-German Concepts and Principles (Intersentia 2018), 
301.  
16 AG Mazak, Opinion, Case C-440-/05 Commission v. Council, [2007] ECR I-9097, para 67. 
17 Ibid.   
18 Ibid., paras 69, 70. 
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We do not have to engage in detail with this discussion, which dates back to the pre-Lisbon era.  
The place of criminal law in the context of the EU legal (and constitutional law) framework has 
to some extent been settled by the Lisbon Treaty. The existence of the emergency brake, for 
instance, reveals the sensitive character of criminal legislation on the EU level.  
 
There is something very important and interesting in AG Mazak’s remarks. EU law looks at 
national criminal law through a narrower lens than that used by domestic law. But whilst this 
is so, this narrower, instrumentalist view of criminal law is not exclusively an EU creature: it 
also forms a part of national criminal law.  
 
AG Mazak is very clear that the EU law looks at criminal law from the narrow point of view of 
effectiveness only. He formulates this aptly: “although its [criminal law’s] deterrent effect 
means that there is certainly a correlation between criminal law and effectiveness, effectiveness 
does not entirely encapsulate the essence of criminal law. [...] the policy considerations behind 
the use of criminal penalties in a given community go well beyond the mere question of 
effective enforcement.”19  
 
What is then the hidden part which the subordination under the principle of effectiveness 
precludes us from seeing? AG Mazak highlights as one of the special characteristics the 
expressive function of the criminal law: criminal law reflects social disapproval. Criminal law 
communicates blame, and the communication of blame may even be part of the mechanism by 
which law operates and becomes effective in society. This is what we will take a look at next. 
 
Criminal law as moral education 
 
The idea that criminal law becomes effective indirectly rather than directly is not new. Whereas 
von Liszt and the sociological school had emphasized the special preventive function of 
criminal law, the Uppsala school and the Scandinavian realists emphasized general prevention. 
General prevention was, however, not understood as being based on the fear of punishment, as 
it had been presented by P.J.A. Feuerbach (above), for instance. Criminal law was rather 
understood to perform its function by supporting and creating morals in the society.  
                                                        
19 Ibid., para 118. 
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The idea of moral education as the aim of systems of punishment had been previously presented 
by Ludwig von Bar in Germany.20 In the case of the Swedish scholars, Per-Olof Ekelöf was 
particularly interested in how criminal law performs its function in moral education.21 Johannes 
Andenaes later extensively studied this idea.22 It has since become a generally-accepted view 
that the communication of blame is a central feature of criminal law when looked at in its 
societal context. Criminal law expresses values and even conceptions of justice. 
 
These days, the idea that criminal law works indirectly in this way is broadly accepted: criminal 
law and the practices of prosecution and conviction support the protection of the core values of 
the society by communicating blame and blameworthiness. This in turn requires that the public 
views criminal law, as well as its procedural law, to be a legitimate way of the forbidden 
conduct. Only through this ‘experienced legitimacy’ may the law succeed in making people 
transcend the narrow perspective of their own self-interest.  
 
Accordingly, today it is common for research to criticise the narrow and instrumental view of 
general deterrence. We could refer to Tom R. Tyler’s lifetime of work on why people obey the 
law23 as well as to Christoph Engel’s findings on how we learn the law.24 Even in the field of 
regulatory studies we find views which stress very different approaches to regulating and 
preventing crime.25 There exists an entire literature on the shortcomings of a narrow law and 
economics rationality model, drawing on advances in empirical psychology.26 The symbolic 
dimension of legislation continues to be an important aspect of debates concerning bio law, for 
instance.27 
                                                        
20 Ludwig von Bar, A History of Continental Criminal Law. (Little etc 1916), 497. 
21 Per Olof Ekelöf, Straffet, skadeståndet och vitet. En studie över de rättsliga sanktionernas 
verkningssätt. (Uppsala 1942), 12. 
22 Johannes Andenaes, Punishment and Deterrence (University of Michigan Press 1974)  
23 Tom R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton University Press 2006); Tom R Tyler, Yuen J. 
Huo, Trust in the Law. Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts (Russell Sage 
Foundation 2002).  
24 Christoph Engel, Learning the Law, Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective 
Goods, Bonn, 2004/5. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=539982 
25 See, for instance, Christopher Hodges, Law and Corporate Behaviour. Integrating Theories of 
Regulation, Enforcement, Compliance and Ethics (Hart 2015). 
26 Cf., for instance, Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Allen Lane 2011)    
27 Rob Schwitters, ‘How Law Matters: Sociological Reflections on the Symbolical Dimension of 
Legislation’, in B. van Klink et al (eds.), Symbolic Legislation Theory and Developments in Biolaw, 
(Legisprudence Library 4. Springer 2016), p. 55-69.  
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In modern theories of punishment, the various viewpoints are often being combined. Both 
special prevention and general prevention matter. Besides general deterrence, the so-called 
‘positive general prevention’ also plays a role. Even restorative justice may be significant for 
some practices.  
 
It is not a surprise that EU criminal law does not share or reproduce all of the fine-grained 
details of Member States’ domestic criminal law and the theories of punishment which have 
inspired them. As we have seen, the history of European integration may have affected the 
formation of the EU criminal approach. Originally, from the point of view of European 
integration, national criminal law and criminal justice were only tools for sanctioning breaches 
of Community (as it then was) law.  
 
Today this is no longer the case. Europe is regarded as a judicial area, as an Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. Judicial co-operation in criminal matters is an integral part of that. What, 
then, makes the discussion of the aims of punishment at the EU law level so difficult? Clearly, 
the EU does not aim to harmonise the deeper ideological premises of criminal law, since quite 
obviously the domestic legal traditions may vary substantially.  
 
We should, however, see that communication of core values through criminal law and justice 
is not something that is completely irrelevant for EU criminal law. Having ‘effective, dissuasive 
and proportionate’ criminal sanctions for serious cross-border crimes is very important for 
European citizens. EU criminal law has moved beyond the stage where we can say that it only 
has an instrumental value. Taking a European perspective, something new emerges. What 
emerges is, however, not a copy of a national system, but something different.  
 
One way of approaching this dilemma or tension would be to look at it from the point of view 
of the legitimacy of EU criminal law. I understand that this was also the approach of the group 
of academics which produced the Manifesto document.28 To my mind, however, the drafters of 
that document were still closely tied with existing developments and lacked the imagination to 
                                                        
28 The Manifesto on European Criminal Policy in 2011.  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201112/20111207ATT33475/20111207ATT3
3475EN.pdf ; also available at EuCLR 2011, 86. 
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paint a larger picture. One of the aims of the group was certainly to assess whether and how EU 
criminal policy as practised was ‘rational’, rationality being assessed against principles 
elaborated by the drafters. The drafters were conscious that what they proposed was a sort of 
Enlightenment critique of the law as then practised.  
 
Still one has to consider that, originally, before the Lisbon era, criminal law cooperation could 
be regarded as belonging to international law. This was the argument made by the Member 
States in order to limit the powers of the Commission and the (then) Community law actors in 
disputes concerning how Community law related to (then) Council-based cooperation within 
justice and home affairs.  
 
Criminal Policy for a Mature Polity 
 
The legitimacy of EU criminal law does not, however, only grow from below. Especially in the 
post-Lisbon framework, a variety of institutional reforms are reflecting new understandings 
which deserve attention. The increased role of the European Parliament, to give just one 
example, strengthens the democratic legitimacy of the measures adopted. The active 
development of European human rights law should of course also be mentioned, not to mention 
about the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘the Charter’). The Charter clearly applies to the 
exercise of powers in the field of criminal justice. The accession of the EU to the European 
Convention of Human Rights, required by the Lisbon Treaty, would also further increase the 
legitimacy of EU criminal law. The current struggles concerning the rule of law and 
independence of the judiciary in some Member States, in turn, are real challenges especially 
since the measures based on mutual recognition, such as the European Arrest Warrant29, tie all 
the jurisdictions together. As a result, a rule of law problem in one of the Member States has an 
impact on all of the others.  
   
If we accept the view that the legitimacy of EU criminal law has indeed increased as a result of 
these concurrent developments, we might gain a new point of view to look at how EU criminal 
law is supposed to become effective.  
                                                        
29 2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States OJ L 190, 18.7.2002. 
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The point is simply that if we emphasize the so-called ‘positive general prevention’ or ‘moral 
education’ point of view, we draw more on the legitimacy of criminal law and less on the fear 
of punishment.30 This will most obviously affect the design of European criminal policy. We 
would no longer measure the performance of individuals and companies solely by resorting to 
a rational actor model. We would see that the addressee of criminal laws could in fact be taken 
to be the law-abiding citizen. 
 
This shift of perspective would be radical since it would change the entire register in which we 
conduct this debate. We would no longer consider minimum rules concerning criminal 
definitions and punishments only under the angle of their limited effectiveness, but we would 
rather see that the EU approach to criminal law fits criminal law ultimate objectives, namely 
that law-abiding citizens understand the moral communication of values. This difference would 
be clearest in the case of actors such as companies which certainly strive to make profit and 
seek economic interest. The questions of how companies act and whether a company 
understands blame, for instance, become the real test.     
 
I would, still, make the caveat: the aim is not to completely do away with general deterrence 
and the narrow economic rationality it represents, but rather to highlight the significance and 
even primacy of positive general prevention. In Habermasian terms, we would read criminal 
law as an institution. To my mind, even European criminal law itself can already be read in 
those terms.    
 
What I suggest is that we would look at criminal justice in terms of symbolic and moral 
communication instead of as a technical tool for steering rational actors. In such a view, act-
proportionality becomes essential: we shift from means-end proportionality to act-
proportionality. We should of course not exaggerate our ability to build on the moral 
communication point of view, but we should not downplay it either. Symbolic use of criminal 
law could even be a problem, if this would mean a lower threshold for criminalizing behavior. 
The European Parliament has referred to this risk in its Resolution on criminal policy: “… it is 
                                                        
30 This would mean a similar turn to that which the Enlightenment critique produced for criminal 
procedure: the accused is now a subject of the proceedings, not merely an object. See Frisch, Wolfgang, 
‘Einheit und Vielfalt des Strafrechts in Europa’, in Festschrift (above, fn 2), 7, 16-17.    
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not sufficient to refer to abstract notions or to symbolic effects, but that the necessity of new 
substantive criminal law provisions must be demonstrated by the necessary factual 
evidence…”.31 
  
We should in any case look at this option more closely, since disregarding it entails a high cost: 
we will be doomed to an ‘administrative sanction’ type of approach, with no real access to the 
domain of criminal law. We would thus be doomed to a managerial position, without being able 
to address the issues by their true name. This would be a contradiction which could, for reasons 
of principle, never be solved.  
 
Objections could be raised, and need to be considered. One could object to the entire idea of 
introducing a legitimacy perspective on the EU criminal law and see it as still being very thin 
in terms of common values. This criticism deserves attention. One should, however, also be 
able to update views on the proper nature of EU criminal law. It is rather obvious that many of 
the surrounding parameters have changed and would at least modestly support our claim. 
 
The other objection would state that the subject matters of EU criminal law do not allow for 
such a reading. When addressing, through criminal policy, issues such as terrorism and 
organized cross-border crime, talk about the citizen’s perspective and moral communication 
does not make sense.  
 
This is a difficult question, I admit. Do we really think that a high degree of legitimacy of the 
criminal law would make a difference in the case of highly-organized and -motivated crime 
which challenges the very presumptions of our legal orders?  
 
My answer would be that human rights, as well as decent crime policies, are the best protection 
against such threats. There is no way we could promote security through criminal justice 
without committing ourselves to the legitimacy perspective. Thus, I do not see how we could 
build an ‘enemy criminal law’ which would enjoy a high legitimacy. An inclusive legal 
perspective is simply part of the European heritage, since the Enlightenment, and it is only 
                                                        
31 European Parliament Resolution of 22 May 2012 on an EU approach to criminal law 
(2010/2310(INI)), Q.3. 
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logical that we emphasize the role of legitimacy of criminal justice. This includes importantly 
also criminal procedure. This is where human rights law comes in.  
 
A third criticism would be that by adopting this perspective, we risk removing all of the careful 
limitations on EU competence in this field. This criticism too must be met. We will later look 
at the risks involved in a symbolic use of law. I would say that we should not do away with 
existing limitations, but nor should we let them restrict out minds in interpreting what we have.  
 
An emphasis on moral communication through criminal law does not mean re-introducing 
punishments of shaming. This is also already clear due to the critical tradition of Enlightenment, 
and such punishments would be prohibited by human rights law.   
 
If I am right, we would have to reconsider the way we look at crime at the EU criminal law 
level. We should introduce a more nuanced and multifaceted approach, one which could be 
termed sociological. Not only would this mean that we would trust less law-and-economics-
type calculations of the relevant levels of punishments. Following this value-oriented reading, 
we would look at EU-level laws as stating certain values. We would have to look at the role of 
human beings even in the case of legal persons (e.g. looking at companies’ employees). This 
shift in perspective would lead us to conceptualise pretty much everything anew. This would, 
however, follow rather naturally from the already-existing body of values and guarantees. In 
terms of crime prevention, we would look at questions such as whistle-blowing more closely, 
we would try to cultivate responsible business cultures and we would adjust our regulations 
accordingly.32 
 
What if we refused to take this path, and instead continued with the current narrow perspective? 
How would the world look like then? My answer would be that the tensions between EU and 
national criminal law would then continue to exist, and may even grow bigger. This is not 
merely a tension between different kinds of legal materials; it is a clash of two rationales. Such 
a tension is very difficult to resolve.   
      
                                                        
32 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law’ COM(2018) 218 final.  
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Fortunately, the European Union has begun to reflect on issues of criminal policy (or criminal 
law policy). A Communication was published by the Commission in 2011.33 This document 
includes some seeds indicating that a new conception might be able to grow. According to the 
Communication, criminal law “reflects the basic values, customs and choices of any given 
society”. The EU thus respects the diversity of legal systems and traditions – but this fact, 
ultimately, increases rather than reducing the importance of consistency and coherence in 
European criminal legislation.  
 
In the Communication, criminal investigations and sanctions are seen as having an impact on 
citizens’ rights. Since these also have a stigmatizing effect, criminal law measures should 
remain the last resort – ultima ratio.34 A test needs to be developed to assess whether this 
requirement is satisfied. The relevant question is, of course, why a criminal law measure is 
needed and why other means do not suffice. This is the first part, the general test. As a second 
step the proposed measure needs to pass another test: this includes a test concerning necessity 
and proportionality (act-proportionality).35       
 
The Communication even includes an explanation of the term ‘effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive’. Effectiveness means, according to this reading, suitability to achieve the desired 
goal. Proportionality requires that the sanction must be commensurate with the gravity of 
conduct and its effects and must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the aim. 
Dissuasiveness means that the sanction constitutes an adequate deterrent for the potential future 
perpetrators.36  
 
To my mind this approach clearly indicates that criminal law is a carrier of values and that 
criminal justice communicates those values. Even though the domestic legal systems are the 
ones that do the job, the contours of European criminal law are becoming visible. The 
Commission’s proposal to place limits on the use of criminal law is a very important sign of 
maturity in this respect. A clear recognition of the criminal law principle of proportionality is 
                                                        
33 Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through 
criminal law. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Brussels 20.9.2011, 
COM(2011) 573 final, 3.   
34 Ibid., 7. 
35 Ibid., 7-8. 
36 Ibid., 9.  
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also significant since it differs from the broader notion of proportionality (act-proportionality 
vs. means-end-proportionality). I would interpret all of this as an effort to increase the 
legitimacy of criminal law. Increased legitimacy, in turn, gives us reasons to contemplate how 
this change will affect the role we see criminal law fulfilling. 
 
An expert working group was set up to advise the Commission when proposing criminal law 
legislation. In one of its meetings, the Expert Group discussed the term ‘effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive’. One of the observations of the group was that when assessing the effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive character of sanctions one should consider not only the legislative 
level but also the application in practice, including procedural aspects. To ensure that an 
imposed sanction is actually enforced is key for deterrence and for the credibility of the system. 
The EU should accordingly work on improving enforcement in and between the Member 
States.37  
 
The Expert Group did not elaborate further on whether the new criminal policy approach of the 
European Union, together with all the developments that have already shaped EU criminal law, 
called for a change to the formula itself. The formula might have needed reinterpretation, 
modification or replacement. It is unclear why the Expert Group was cautious in this respect, 
but it may arise from differences of opinion amongst the scholars themselves. In their discussion 
on approximation of sentencing, the Expert Group was divided in its approach. “Whereas some 
experts aimed at creating more equality in sentencing between Member States, others focused 
on the preservation of the coherence of the national legal systems.”38 
A novel approach to the communication of blame would be needed to interpret the meaning for 
EU criminal law of the fact that conviction and sentencing in one Member State may be 
different from one in another Member. Is it a shortcoming? Or is it maybe simply a feature 
which enables us to learn? Since we all know this fact, we will be able to learn about those 
differences. For a Pole to learn about sentencing in France may contain some surprises, but the 
moral message of the sentencing comes through in any case. Once we see that we should look 
                                                        
37Key findings Expert Group on EU Criminal Policy, Meeting 19 June 2012. 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2760 
Accessed 16 July 2019.  
38Key findings Expert Group on EU criminal policy, meeting 12 March 2014. 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2760 
Accessed 16 July 2019. 
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behind the surface level of law and legal practice, we start seeing the dimension of values. Only 
if we force ourselves to a narrow rational actor model do we face a problem here.  
This problem is easily solved once we adopt a positive general prevention approach, or more 
broadly an approach which allows for a more social and sociological reading of the law. Even 
if the sentence in France were more lenient (or more harsh, for that matter) than the one a Polish 
court would impose in a similar case, the French court’s judgment could very well contribute 
to an understanding that certain rules of conduct apply and are effectively criminally sanctioned 
and can and will be dealt with by the French authorities. This message would be sent to the 
entire population of EU.   
This is where things get really exciting. The new approach would cast new light on the idea of 
developing a common European legal consciousness, a common mindset. This was an idea that 
we used to see references to, that there should be a mental equivalent to the legal practices 
created through criminal law cooperation. In the early days I was of the opinion that this was 
impossible due to the great variety of approaches amongst the Member States. As long as the 
purely technical and instrumental approach prevailed, any deeper meaning had to be sought in 
a domestic context. We could of course continue to be sceptical about the idea of deeper values 
even domestically, since our communities are diverse and any supposed consensus on values 
has to be rather abstract. But if we dare to be engaged with a more substantial, legitimacy-based 
reading, we might see that the European criminal law possesses such features as well. It opens 
up to a reading of this kind.  
 
My claim is that it is time to look at EU crime policy also in terms of its ability to draw on 
legitimacy. This would ease the tensions between the EU criminal law level and the domestic 
level. EU criminal law is of course only a patchwork, especially if we do not include all of the 
Member States’ legal systems in this concept. But we have enough European characteristics to 
justify talking of a ‘European approach’. Surely, in all European criminal justice systems 
criminal law enjoys a particular position and can be distinguished from administrative law. It 
is part of European tradition since the Enlightenment that criminal law exists for the protection 
of freedoms, while affecting some other fundamental rights, and that its use requires 
justification. And, as we should note, a symbolic dimension can be read also other types of law, 
not just criminal law. 
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The European Parliament has issued a Resolution on issues of how to develop criminal law at 
the EU level.39 In this Resolution, the European Parliament criticises existing EU criminal law 
for its fragmented nature. It therefore contends that criminal law should "constitute a coherent 
legislative system governed by a set of fundamental principles and standards of good 
governance in full respect of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention 
on Human Rights and other international human rights conventions…”.  
The EU approach, as conceived by the European Parliament, shows in a rather clear and simple 
way that the EU has been maturing in the way it sees EU-wide collaboration in terms of criminal 
law measures. Accordingly, it is possible that a new mindset might emerge. It would distinguish 
itself as a European approach which differentiates itself vis-à-vis other approaches. The 
European approach would distinguish itself not only in taking criminal procedural guarantees 
seriously, but also as regards a different understanding of how criminal law operates and how 
it gets its steering force through being legitimate.  
 
In some earlier documents it was argued that a shared European sense of justice would be useful 
and that, for instance, harmonisation of criminal sanctions across Europe could promote this.40 
It seems clear that no strong expressions of a shared sense of justice have emerged. But, in any 
case, we could say that the creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice itself, with so 
many shared criminal definitions, could be interpreted as expressing some minimum 
understanding of a shared sense of justice. This has been underlined by existing practices of 
collaboration in cross-border criminal cases.   
 
The positive general prevention thought is part of European heritage and it can easily be traced 
to the classic sociological insights of Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, for instance. One cold 
also refer to the communicative theory of Jürgen Habermas.41 We should of course not 
overinterpret the thickness of any such consciousness. It is only one layer of European criminal 
thought. We should also be mindful that not even on the domestic level can we talk about any 
shared legal consciousness in a thicker sense. Our communities are far too diverse for that. 
                                                        
39 European Parliament Resolution of 22 May 2012 on an EU approach to criminal law 
(2010/2310(INI)), 2013/C 264 E/02.  
40 Cf. Green Paper on the approximation, mutual recognition and enforcement of criminal sanctions in 
the European Union. Brussels, 30.4.2014. COM(2004))334 final, at 9. 
41 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (MIT Press 1996).   
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Having said that, maybe criminal law is there to fill some gaps. It is able to communicate values 
in a similar sense to a constitution.  
 
A general prevention emphasis fits into European criminal law since the emphasis has been on 
approximation of crime definitions for so-called ‘Eurocrimes’. The definition of the elements 
of an offence operates precisely on the level of requirements of actions, and as such regulates 
the conduct which falls within the definition. This may be one of the reasons why a general 
deterrence approach has been so natural. People simply need to know what is punishable and 
what not. General deterrence works on this level as well. But what I wish to present is an 
alternative account, since the theory of positive general prevention has also implications for the  
so-called special part, and in particular for the elements that must comprise a "criminal offence". 
 
We should also remember that this approach does not exclude the relevance of individual 
prevention. It makes sense to take into consideration individual prevention aspects when the 
court decides on punishment in an individual case. It is important that we do not read the 
effectiveness requirement in a way which would exclude such considerations. This would go 
against the main structure of most criminal justice systems and jeopardise their rationality. It is 
important that European criminal law recognizes the features of criminal law as these manifest 
themselves on the level of domestic law.  
 
We are not the first to point out that an instrumental approach needs to be accompanied by 
something else, something which would account for the non-instrumental values, expressive 
values and functions. Ester Herlin-Karnell has discussed this, and has also pointed out the risks 
that incorporating the non-instrumental values will entail.42  
 
Jenia Iontcheva Turner has made the very interesting observation that the Framework Decision 
concerning Racism and Xenophobia stands out as an effort of the European Union to make a 
statement as regards these forms of crime, in spite of the fact that these crimes are infrequently 
cross-border in nature.43 It is indeed true that racism and xenophobia hit very deep in the 
                                                        
42 Ester Herlin-Karnell, ‘Effectiveness and the Constitutional Limits in European Criminal Law’, 5 New 
J. Eur. Crim. L. 267 (2014). See also the critical remarks in Thomas Elholm, Does EU Criminal 
Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression?, 17 Eur. J. Crime, Crim. Law & Crim. Just. 191 
(2009), 219-226.     
43 Jenia Iontcheva Turner, ‘The Expressive Dimension of EU Criminal Law’. 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 555 
(2012). 
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European mindset and the core roots underlying European integration. Racism and xenophobia 
have a direct link to human rights law, and the underlying values grow from European history. 
We should remember that hate speech offences are in fact a rare case in which the European 
Court of Human Rights (and the previous European Commission of Human Rights) has applied 
the doctrine of prohibition of abuse of rights (ECHR, art 17).44  
 
We should note that criminal law’s symbolic function really is in some sense detached from its 
utilitarian deterrence function. We simply have to make this symbolic statement, and the crucial 
significance of this move is that we recognize that there are legitimate limitations on the use of 
freedom of speech: speech denying the human dignity of members of certain vulnerable groups 
is not protected by the article concerning freedom of speech (ECHR, art 10). The ultimate 
concern is that letting hate speech run wild might pose concrete risks risk core European values, 
something we do not wish to see happening. It is rather obvious that in this context, we regard 
as secondary the question of how individual potential perpetrators reason in their reflections on 
this law and the potential punishment it sets for. The legislature really seeks to communicate 
basic values by this statement. Good expressivists are consequentialists, too, says Cass R. 
Sunstein.45    
    
Sionaigh Douglas-Scott has taken up the case why the EU is having difficulty building its laws 
on anything like a concept of justice.46 She has doubts as to whether we could use the term 
‘sense of justice’ at the European level. She even doubts that human rights could embody such 
a sense. As I have stated above, I believe that we could interpret at least some EU law to express 
a view of justice. Criminal law norms may have this capacity. Expressivity may be found 
whether or not it was intended by the legislature.47 These norms would be measured in terms 
of justice, assuming that this is the minimum requirement. As has been noted, construction and 
implementation of policy, law and action “designed to affect the lives of people” axiomatically 
means that we cannot escape the demands of justice.48  
                                                        
44 Cf., for instance, Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Decision of the Commission, 11 
October 1979, and Williamson v. Germany (ECtHR, 8 January 2019).  
45 Cass R. Sunstein, ‘On the Expressive Function of Law’. 144 Un. Penn. L. Rev. 1995, p. 2021, 2045.  
46 Sionaigh Douglas-Scott, ‘Human Rights as a Basis for Justice in the European Union’. Transnational 
Legal Theory, Vol 8, Issue 1, 2017, 59. 
47 Gareth Davies, ‘Social Legitimacy and Purposive Power: The End, the Means and the Consent of the 
People’, in Dimitry Kochenov et al (Eds.), Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Hart Publishing 2015), 259, 265.  
48 Andrew Williams, The Ethos of Europe. Values, Law and Justice in the EU (CUP 2010), 294. 
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‘Justice’ is a big word and different meanings can be attached to it. If we follow the line chosen 
by Amartya Sen, we may mean a certain commitment to the improvement of existing human 
conditions, a pragmatic approach, instead of a full theory of a perfectly just society. Reducing 
racism might serve the goal for justice in the very sense of addressing a perceived injustice.49  
 
What about the ‘sense of justice’, understood in empirical terms? Is there any hope of us 
Europeans ever adopting the views propagated by our criminal law against racism? I cannot 
begin any longer answer here. In some sense a clear statement is not anything that would 
directly arise out of popular European legal consciousness. But this is precisely the reason why 
it is needed. A statement aims at having an impact on that, in the interest of justice, understood 
in Senian terms. A statement may guide European citizens and inform them in a way which is 
different from a rational actor model, narrowly defined.  
 
As stated by Rob Schwitters, a sociological account of compliance acknowledges the combined 
effect of shifts in the opportunity structure and internalisation. A legislated rule, which “brings 
behavior more in tune with reflected interests”, may have further effects since it may “produce 
an important change in behavior”. Initially it may be dependent on coercive force, but soon it 
comes instead to rely on communicative underpinning.50 
 
We should, in any event, add that empirical studies have shown that communities may share 
views in the name of a sense of justice. This has been dealt with extensively by Paul H. 
Robinson. Communities, however, develop shared understandings only of the core features of 
criminal law regulations. A (shared) sense of justice does not give answers as regards the penal 
values in detail. However, a community may share a sense of justice in the sense of recognizing 
the relative blameworthiness of different offences.51  
 
In fact, this finding may partly explain why the approach of approximation of criminal penalties 
by setting rigid requirements concerning the penalty scales for specific crimes (‘minimum 
                                                        
49 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Allen Lane, London 2009).  
50 Rob Schwitters, ‘How Law Matters: Sociological Reflections on the Symbolic Dimension of 
Legislation’, in B. van Klink et al (eds.), Symbolical Legislation Theory and Developments in Biolaw 
(Legisprudence Library 4, Springer 2016).  
51 Robinson, Paul H., Intuitions of Justice and the Utility of Desert (OUP, Oxford 2013). 
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maximum penalty range’) has not been very successful as a means of harmonising the national 
rules on levels of criminal sanctions. The ‘message’ of the harmonising instrument simply 
means very different things when received by the national legal order. A new approach, 
focussing instead on the relative comparability of the severity of the offence in different national 
legal orders, would seem a welcome development. We would accordingly wish to make sure 
that in the national legal order the punishments enjoy a similar relative position. A category-
approach has been proposed. Such an approach would very well fit into the idea that the 
European criminal law touches on the symbolical levels of criminal and promotes the 
emergence of a European way of looking at certain crimes. This approach deserves closer 
scrutiny, but prima facie it would help to avoid some of the obvious flaws of the previous 
regulatory model.52 
 
Such an approach would build more on the values enshrined in the national legal orders than 
the current model which uses rather blunt instruments to approximate penal sanctions. 
Especially in the long run, an approach built on relative comparability of categories of offences 
would enable European law to build more directly on the coherence of the national legal order. 
Today, instead, approximation presents itself as an intervention securing only harmonisation as 
to a minimum level of seriousness.        
  
The European Union may exercise some influence on the relative blameworthiness of 
Eurocrimes. Thus it may exercise some influence on what activities are made punishable. 
Through both of the routes outlined above, then, we can observe some avenues to impact and 
express a shared sense of justice. We cannot be too optimistic about this putative European 
shared sense of justice: the foundations and sources are still very weak and vulnerable and 
European citizens most likely do not even recognize that these choices rest on a European 
foundation, since the authorities continue to apply domestic implementing laws. For the most 
part, only some lawyers know about the EU origins of certain law amendments.            
  
A few words of caution need to be added. I regard it as a benefit that if we turn to the register 
of blame and communication, we can free ourselves from the iron cage of general deterrence, 
which basically calls for harsh treatment where needed. If 5 years of imprisonment does not 
                                                        
52 Helmut Satzger, ‘The Harmonisation of Criminal Sanctions in the European Union’, EuCrim 
2019/2, 115.    
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deter, maybe 10 years would. It provides a general rationale for harsher treatment if criminality 
is a problem, as it almost always is. By making a communicative turn we can see that the mere 
existence of criminality does not challenge our criminal policy since crime cannot be made to 
disappear. There is a cost of fighting crime, and that is a reason why we need a rational crime 
policy.  
 
In terms of communicative theory, the legitimacy of criminal sanctions is conditional. We 
would have to discuss separately, for instance, how to justify the use of imprisonment in the 
first place.53 There are many punishment theories, and it is not possible to discuss all of the 
options and their combinations here. Suffice it to say that the most important choice is the one 
we take to broaden our perspective from the general deterrence to other viewpoints and that we 
understand that the ability of criminal law to function grows together with increased 
legitimacy.54 If criminal law is based on moral communication of blame, it needs itself to satisfy 
high moral criteria. In the French discussion, the expressive function of criminal law has been 
linked with crime as a transgression of a taboo. Taboos create order. The values are expressed 
in taboos which give rise to punishments.55 
 
International treaty crimes are part of a system of international policy making which only 
becomes criminal law in the domestic criminal law systems. European criminal law has the 
potential to grow to become something more than that. By maturing, it has the potential to 
become conscious of its distinctive European approach to crime control and crime prevention. 
Criminal law would be approached in a balanced manner, not as a repressive tool alone.     
 
Mireille Delmas-Marty introduced the concept of Europe as a laboratory of legal pluralism.56 
What I am proposing here proceeds in a similar direction. Internal market law was originally 
dominated by economic efficiency, and European human rights law was a quite separate story, 
with only limited points of contact between the two. What we see today is the emergence of a 
                                                        
53 See the discussion in Klaus Günther, ‘Criminal Law, Crime and Punishment as Communication’, in 
AP Simister et al (Eds.), Liberal Criminal Theory. Essays for Andreas von Hirsch. (Hart, Oxford 2014), 
123. 
54 Cf., for instance, several essays, including Claus Roxin’s, in the volume AP Simister et al (Eds.), 
Liberal Criminal Theory. Essays for Andreas von Hirsch (Hart 2014).  
55 Cf. Mireille Delmas-Marty, Towards a Truly Common Law. Europe as a Laboratory for Legal 
Pluralism (CUP 2002), 10.  
56 Delmas-Marty, ibid. 
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European law which still regulates the market but which goes way beyond that. Introducing 
criminal law cooperation to the heart of the legal integration has changed the heart itself. My 
proposal to take this heart seriously means that we should recognize the potential that a common 
European crime policy, even a narrow and thin one, may have. We have thus the opportunity 
to rethink the rationality of our law.  
 
On the European level this means a merger of regimes and a kind of a collision of rationalities. 
On the vertical line we also see that European policies may become more serious, better-
informed, and more legitimacy-based rather than simply dominated by the external and 
effectiveness perspectives. For Delmas-Marty, European human rights law presents the source 
of ethical authority which is able to grant legitimacy to legal orders which come into contact 
with it. I do not disagree. I would, at any rate, say that by also reinterpreting the role of criminal 
law in the European setting we may be able to determine conditions under which the criminal 
law itself may be perceived as legitimate, and so mediate the systemic frames conferred by the 
human rights tradition. Since the body of norms of EU criminal law was established before EU 
criminal policy principles were reflected upon and adopted, the real life of law may of course 
look worse than what could be expected. This will make the entire enterprise somewhat more 
difficult. Even if we would start rather working towards securing a relative comparability of the 
levels of criminal sanctions, the previous measures have already brought about changes which 
set the stage.        
 
This may all sound complicated but it does not necessarily have to be. Both European criminal 
law and human rights law have their origin in Enlightenment thought, which heavily criticized 
pre-existing criminal justice practices due to their lack of legitimacy. Criminal law of the ancien 
régime was not crafted to serve the interest of safeguarding freedom. The quest for legitimacy 
was formulated in this critique, and the entire development of criminal law in Europe which 
has followed can be seen as efforts to formulate criminal law which would enjoy a high 
legitimacy and be restricted to what is necessary in terms of protecting core freedoms.57 
 
The story of the role of criminal law in the EC/EU setting was different, since it was originally 
not meant to be relevant. Over the years, and especially since the Treaty of Amsterdam, criminal 
law became a central policy field. The domestic criminal justice systems remain different and 
                                                        
57 Cf., for instance, Markus Dirk Dubber, The Dual Penal State (OUP 2018) 
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not convergent by any reasonable standard. Mutual recognition was set as the cornerstone 
principle. If convergence takes places, reasons other than EU criminal law cooperation for its 
own sake stand behind it. But, for each domestic system, there is a single European reference 
point, or two, if we regard European human rights law as a separate entity. Drawing more on 
the relative comparability approach, a bridge could be created between national values and 
European values, and the senses of justice informing the two would draw more on each other. 
 
We could even refer to the rule of law discussions and rule of law commitments as part of a 
general European frame. Since Europe has introduced a system of mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions, a judicial area has emerged in which the rights of the European citizens are at stake 
if, for instance, the independence of the judiciary did not exist in some of the Member States. 
There is a common European reference point, and a common European standard. Most 
certainly, if we would look at Europe from the outside, both human rights and commitment to 
high standards of rule of law would stand out. For an outsider, looking at European criminal 
law as culturally embedded in its thicker forms would be rather natural.  
 
What I have been suggesting above may come as a surprise to many. It would have been a 
surprise to me too, previously: back in 2003 I wrote rather cynically about any effort to 
harmonize criminal law on the European level, especially if we would include harmonisation 
of criminal sanctions. I quote myself:58 
 
“Taking into consideration the reasons behind the current diversity in Europe, 
there is not much hope that one could formulate the guiding criminal policy 
principles, fill them with common evaluations, and be able to reform the whole of 
penal sanctions in order to create a reasonable convergence in the area. The 
differences are not only random and accidental, they are systemic.”      
 
What I suggest is that scholarship too could play a role here. It should discuss the deeper 
rationales of our criminal law thinking and help introduce some of them to the European debates 
on where to go with criminal law and criminal policy. It might even be helpful to have this 
                                                        
58 Kimmo Nuotio, ‘Reasons for maintaining the diversity’, in Mireille Delmas-Marty, Geneviéve 
Giudicelli-Delage, Élisabeth Lambert-Abdelgawad (Eds.) L’harmonisations des sanctions pénales en 
Europe (Société de Législation Comparée 2003), 465, 470. 
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debate on the European level since it would be important for the Member States themselves to 
be mindful of the European heritage. It is of utmost importance that the European approach in 
fighting terrorism, to give one example, follows the European models and principles which are 
emerging.  
    
Conclusion 
 
I propose that we look back at the development of European criminal law and see that it has 
matured in several ways. European law today recognizes better than it did previously the 
distinct character of criminal law, a recognition which has come after many years of intense 
debates of whether criminal law deserves to be treated differently from other fields or not. That 
recognition, together with other legal developments – especially as concerns the role human 
rights and fundamental rights on the European level –, enables us to take a fresh look at the 
actual and potential legitimacy of European criminal law. The increased involvement of the 
European Parliament also deserves to be mentioned. All this calls for taking a fresh look also 
at the way we see European criminal law operating. In my view, we need to challenge the 
dominance of narrow effectiveness thinking and the view that general deterrence is the leading 
understanding of the mechanisms of how criminal law works in the society.  
 
The general deterrence model has obvious advantages since it is a simple form which is easily 
understandable and which benefits from being based on a model of rational choice and rational 
action. Economics brings with it a flavour of precision and empirical grounding. The dominance 
of general deterrence has, however, the disadvantage that it leads to an overtly instrumental 
approach to criminal law which in turn leads to a failure to recognize the deeper sense in which 
criminal law is able to communicate values and expectations in a society. This failure has a 
high price since it leads to the failure to see the potential of increasing effectiveness through 
legitimacy. Seen through the lens of positive general prevention, European criminal law may 
have achieved more than what one would assume looking at it only the lens of law and 
economics rationality. A fresh look would also enable us to theorize better as too what justice 
means for our law. The symbolic effects of criminal law, which call for sociological 
understandings, lead the way towards questions of justice, including those regarding the 
European mindset, a European sense of justice. The academic proposal to introduce a new 
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model for approximating criminal sanctions is a welcome initiative and it would take us in the 
right direction.  
    
Having said all that, we should bear in mind that the potential of European criminal law is still 
rather limited and we should not expect the maturity that I have been speaking about to do away 
with the structural limitations which still characterize this fragmented field which we call 
European criminal law. It will remain fragmented and something far less than the criminal law 
we know it in the national context. In any case, reading criminal law through the lens of criminal 
law theory, and also through social theory which has at this point informed our theories of crime 
and punishment for a long time, enables us to recognize the links criminal law has to core values 
of a society. It also enables us to interpret Europe loosely as a legal community, a criminal law 
community, which shares certain understandings simply since it shares some views on crime 
and has taken legislative measures to implement those views.  
 
I believe that the reinterpretation that I propose would also serve the purpose of defining 
European criminal law as something fundamentally European. A law and economics type of 
instrumental view on criminal law is, in fact, not a very European approach. It would be of 
particular value to build the European approach on European values, on the European tradition 
which includes Enlightenment thought and the critique of criminal law as part of it. The 
sociological approaches to compliance are part of a European heritage. An interpretation which 
accounts for this tradition would make visible the legitimacy potential of criminal law when 
properly conceived. It takes seriously the legitimacy requirement and responds to it. It serves 
European citizens by being what European citizens expect it to be: a European response to 
problems of criminality. Thus it also speaks the same language as human rights law – equally 
a very European matter – and the fundamental rights law of the European Union. This 
reinterpretation is a tribute to European tradition, but it should of course not only be a tribute, 
but it should serve the creation of even more elaborate and rational criminal policy and criminal 
law for Europe.    
 
 
 
